Hearing an application for leave to appeal
Two key issues:
The respondents' written submissions at paragraph 21 repeat from the judgment that is the subject to the appeal that the judge stated he proposed considering the applicant's amended statement of claim even though it was not filed, in conclusion saying that "No party objected to this course".
The respondents' written submissions at paragraph 22 describe how the judge's instruction to the Registrar to not file the applicant's amended statement of claim "alleviated" a "potential unfairness to the Respondents".
- The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 describes how Registrars are to be free from external influence in how they perform their duties. Section 35A(4) contains the prohibition on influencing Registrars.
- The applicant did not know of this section at the time the Judge wrote "No party objected to this course of action". This does not matter either way. A self-litigant cannot authorise a judicial officer to breach the Federal Court of Australia Act.
- It is a matter for the Court to ensure judicial officers of the Court comply with its own Act and Rules.
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| Still waiting for a Federal Judicial Commission in Australia |
Written submissions of the parties
Submissions by the Applicant:
APPLICANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Application for Leave to Appeal
No. ACD 66 of 2025
Federal Court of Australia
District Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General
COLIN GEORGE DUNSTAN
Applicant
ROBYN ORR and others named in the schedule
Respondents
1. INTRODUCTION
1. These submissions are filed in support of the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal from the judgment delivered on 25 July 2025.
2. The Applicant does not seek, on this application, to argue the merits of the proposed appeal.
3. The submission is confined to the proposition that the affidavit material discloses a procedural history which gives rise to issues of procedure and legal process that are capable of appellate consideration by the Full Court.
2. PURPOSE AND LIMITS OF THE AFFIDAVIT MATERIAL
4. The affidavits filed in support of the application do not seek to establish error or to resolve disputed factual matters.
5. Their purpose is to place before the Court the procedural history and documentary context in which the proposed appeal arises.
6. That history, taken as a whole, discloses procedural matters which are capable of giving rise to an arguable appeal and which are not confined to findings of fact or the exercise of discretion.
3. PROCEDURAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE AMENDED PLEADING
7. As set out in the first affidavit, the proposed appeal raises issues concerning the procedural treatment of the Applicant’s amended pleading and the basis upon which it was taken into account in the judgment of 25 July 2025.
8. Without inviting the Court to determine those issues at this stage, the affidavit material establishes that:
(a) the amended pleading was lodged prior to the hearing but accepted for filing only after judgment;
(b) different explanations appear in the record as to whether leave was required and how the pleading was treated; and
(c) the procedural basis upon which the amended pleading was taken into account is not apparent from the contemporaneous record.
9. The Applicant does not invite any inference as to why those matters occurred. They are relied upon only to demonstrate that the proposed appeal is not unarguable and raises issues of procedure and legal process.
4. PROCEDURAL CONTEXT OF THE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT ORDER
10. The second affidavit addresses the procedural circumstances in which the vexatious litigant order was made.
11. The affidavit establishes the following chronology:
(a) the judgment of 25 July 2025 foreshadowed consideration of such an order;
(b) the Applicant filed an application for leave to appeal from that judgment shortly thereafter;
(c) a hearing took place on 12 December 2025; and
(d) on 19 December 2025, a vexatious litigant order was made by the same judicial officer.
12. The Applicant does not, on this application, challenge the Court’s power to make such an order, nor invite the Court to determine its correctness. No submission is made that the timing of that order was improper.
5. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES
13. When the matters disclosed by both affidavits are considered together, they reveal a procedural posture in which:
(a) the correctness of the judgment of 25 July 2025 is proposed to be tested on appeal;
(b) the procedural treatment of material relevant to that judgment is itself in issue; and
(c) a subsequent order now operates as a threshold requirement affecting the institution of proceedings in this Court.
14. The Applicant submits that this unusual procedural interaction between the proposed appeal and the current procedural constraints is a relevant consideration on an application for leave.
6. WHY LEAVE SHOULD BE GRANTED
15. Leave should be granted because:
(a) the proposed appeal raises procedural and legal issues that are not confined to factual disagreement;
(b) those issues are capable of affecting the fairness or correctness of the judgment under appeal; and
(c) the present procedural posture creates a risk that the appeal process will be complicated by procedural constraints that arose after the appeal was instituted.
16. Granting leave would permit those issues to be considered in an orderly way by the Full Court.
7. MATTERS NOT SOUGHT TO BE DETERMINED
17. The Applicant does not invite the Court, on this application:
(a) to determine the merits of the proposed appeal;
(b) to determine the correctness of the vexatious litigant order; or
(c) to resolve disputed questions of fact.
18. The submission is confined to whether the proposed appeal is arguable and whether leave should be granted.
8. CONCLUSION
19. For those reasons, the Applicant submits that leave to appeal should be granted.
12 February 2026
Colin Dunstan
Applicant
Submissions by the Respondents:
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ACT DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 66 of 2025
Colin George Dunstan
Applicant
Robyn Orr
First Respondent
John Higham
Second Respondent
John Growder
Third Respondent
Commonwealth of Australia
Fourth Respondent
RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS FOR HEARING ON 19 FEBRUARY 2026
Introduction
1. The Respondents oppose the granting of leave to appeal from the orders made by Thawley J on 25 July 2025 and his Honour’s judgment in Dunstan v Orr [2025] FCA 858 ( Thawley Judgment or J ). The Applicant’s proposed appeal (as set out in the Amended Draft Notice of Appeal) has no prospects of succeeding and, in accordance with the applicable principles, the Amended Application for Leave to Appeal should be dismissed with costs.
2. The hearing before the primary judge was not a substantive hearing of the matter, but rather a hearing as to whether the proceedings should be summarily dismissed. In considering that question, the primary judge made substantive findings against the Applicant that the proceedings constituted an abuse of process. On that basis, the primary judge summarily dismissed the proceedings. Subsequently (and after the initial Application for Leave to Appeal was filed), the primary judge made a vexatious litigant order in reliance on the same findings of abuse of process. (The vexatious litigant order will be referred to further below but is not subject of the current application for leave to appeal.)
3. There is no challenge to the findings as to abuse of process made by the primary judge. The Respondents contend that the current application for leave to appeal is meritless and is a continuation of the same abuse of process and should be dismissed accordingly.
Relevant background
4. A general summary of the factual and procedural background leading up to the Thawley Judgment can be found at J [10]-[27]. The Respondents do not intend to repeat that summary in any detail here. For present purposes, it suffices to set out the following matters:
(a) The Applicant’s grievance relates to events of the late 1990s regarding the suspension of his employment with the Australian Tax Office ( ATO ): J [4].
(b) Besanko Proceedings. In 1998, the Applicant commenced proceedings against the same four Respondents in the Federal Court seeking review of certain decisions relating to his suspension from the ATO: J [11(25)]. In 2008, Besanko J dismissed those proceedings: Dunstan v Orr (2008) 217 FCR 559; [2008] FCA 31 ( Besanko Judgment ): J [11(26)]. An appeal from the Besanko Judgment was filed but later dismissed due to the Applicant’s failure to comply with procedural orders: J [11(30)].
(c) ACTSC Proceedings. In 2010, the Applicant brought fresh proceedings against the same four Respondents (as well as others) in the ACT Supreme Court relating to the same events of 1997: J [11(33)]. Those proceedings raised various claims including misfeasance in public office and conspiracy: J [11(34)-(39)]. In 2014, Burns J dismissed those proceedings: Dunstan v Higham [2014] ACTSC 206 ( Burns Judgment ): J [11(39)]. An appeal from the Burns Judgment was dismissed by the ACT Court of Appeal: Dunstan v Higham (2016) 310 FLR 58; ACTCA 20: J [11(45)].
(d) Wigney Proceedings. In 2021, the Applicant commenced fresh proceedings against the same four Respondents in the Federal Court alleging, first, the Commonwealth was negligent for permitting its officers to give false evidence in the Besanko and ACTSC Proceedings and concealing or suppressing evidence in each proceeding (J [12(58)- (60)]) and, secondly, the Besanko Judgment was procured by fraud either through the Commonwealth’s officers giving false evidence or legal representatives misleading the Court: J [12(61)-(63)]. In 2023, Wigney J summarily dismissed those proceedings: Dunstan v Orr (No 2) [2023] FCA 1536 ( Wigney Judgment ). Relevantly, Wigney J held that the proceedings disclosed no reasonable cause of action and, more fundamentally, were an abuse of process in seeking to relitigate issues that were or could have been raised in the Besanko or ACTSC Proceedings: Wigney Judgment at [221]- [231]. An appeal from the Wigney Judgment was filed but later discontinued: J [20].
(e) Thawley Proceedings. In 2024, instead of pursuing the appeal from the Wigney Judgment, the Applicant filed fresh proceedings against the same four Respondents in the Federal Court alleging the Wigney Judgment was procured by fraud: J [77]. In 2025, Thawley J summarily dismissed those proceedings on the basis that, as referred to above, the proceedings were an abuse of process in seeking to reagitate matters that the Applicant had been pursuing for many years and which were repeatedly determined against him: J [93]-[106]. Following a further hearing (in late 2025), Thawley J made a vexatious litigant order against the Applicant prohibiting him from instituting proceedings without leave of the Court: Dunstan v Orr (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCA 1653 ( VLO Judgment ).
5. It is against the factual backdrop above that the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal falls to be considered.
Proposed grounds of appeal
6. The totality of the proposed grounds of appeal is as follows:
1. The Court erred in proceeding on the basis that the Applicant’s amended pleading had been validly taken into account, where the procedural basis upon which it was so taken into account was unclear.
2. The Court erred in dismissing the proceeding without resolving, or adequately addressing, the procedural status of the Applicant’s amended pleading.
3. The Court erred in summarily dismissing the proceeding in circumstances where the procedural treatment of material relied upon by the Applicant was not apparent from the record.
4. In the alternative, the judgment is affected by procedural error such that it cannot stand.
7. Accordingly, the present application for leave to appeal relates solely to the position adopted by the primary judge in respect of the Applicant’s proposed amended pleadings. The circumstances in which the primary judge permitted the Applicant to rely upon his proposed amended pleadings is set out at paragraphs 18 to 22 below. It suffices, however, to note here that those draft grounds relate exclusively to issues of practice and procedure in the approach adopted by the primary judge.
Legal principles
8. The primary judge entered judgment in the Respondents’ favour under both s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ( FCA Act ) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). 1 It follows from the entry of judgment under s 31A of the FCA Act, that any appeal cannot be brought without leave of the Court: FCA Act, s 24(1A).
9. To secure a grant of leave to appeal, the Applicant must show:
(a) in all the circumstances there is sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the primary decision to warrant the Full Court’s review; and
(b) assuming the primary decision to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the Applicant if leave were refused: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at [2].
10. These two limbs are cumulative and leave will not be granted unless each is satisfied: AIX20 v Director-General of Security [2025] FCAFC 38 at [13].
11. Relevantly, as alluded to above, the proposed grounds of appeal exclusively take issue with how the primary judge, procedurally, treated the Applicant’s proposed amended pleadings. Accordingly, while it may be accepted that the primary judge’s ultimate order (summarily dismissing the proceedings as an abuse of process) affected substantive rights, 2 the draft grounds of appeal only concern the procedural treatment by the primary judge of the proposed amended pleadings. 3 It follows that the usual principles governing appeals on matters of practice and procedure ought to also apply here (whether directly, or alternatively, by analogy).
12. Those principles dictate that caution be applied when considering such an appeal ( Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wines Estates Ltd [2017] FCAFC 98; 252 FCR 1 at [41]-[42]), and further, the appellant will come under a “ heavy burden ”: Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCAFC 117 at [8] and [11]. This, in turn, bears upon the prospects of the appeal given, as stated by Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391:
[62] … [I]t will seldom be in the interests of the administration of justice to grant leave where an appeal has little or no prospects of success, because of the considerable additional resources expended by the parties and the Court, and the inevitable impact on other litigants who have abided by time limits and are waiting for their appeals to be heard, in circumstances where an unsuccessful outcome can be confidently predicted at the leave stage. …
13. For the reasons set out below, the Court can safely conclude that the proposed appeal has no prospects of succeeding.
Proposed grounds of appeal are vague and embarrassing
14. First , the draft appeal grounds (extracted in full at paragraph 6 above) are embarrassing and do not give rise to any discernible basis to contend the primary judge made any appealable error. It is appreciated that the Applicant is not a lawyer and is self-represented. However, it is difficult to discern the actual grounds of appeal for which the Applicant is seeking leave to bring. No particular paragraph of the Thawley Judgment is mentioned, nor is it clear what decision, ruling or order the Applicant is seeking to challenge.
15. Instead, proposed grounds 1 and 2 appear to take issue with how his “ amended pleading ” was treated ‘procedurally’, but no actual error is raised by either ground. Similarly, grounds 3 and 4 are self-evidently vague and embarrassing, failing to disclose any actual issue with a ‘procedural decision’ made by the primary judge.
16. These shortcomings of the draft appeal grounds have the consequence that:
(a) The Applicant is a long way from satisfying the two limbs set out in paragraph 9 above, particularly from discharging the “ heavy burden ” in seeking to take issue with matters of practice and procedure: Oswal at [8] and [11].
(b) Allowing leave to appeal will cause the unnecessary drain of yet further judicial resources (in the form of a Full Court hearing) and the resources of the Respondents in circumstances where the appeal has no prospects of succeeding: MZABP at [62].
The Applicant’s amended pleadings were properly considered by the primary judge
17. Secondly , there is no conceivable basis to take any issue with how the primary judge chose to treat the Applicant’s “ amended pleading ”. Grounds 1 and 2 (and possibly grounds 3 and 4, too) appear to relate to the two amended pleadings the Applicant sought to rely upon at the hearing before the primary judge: i.e. one “ lengthier ” and another “ shorter ” amended pleading identified and marked by the Court as “ MFI 1 ” and “ MFI 2 ”, respectively (see J [23]).
18. The Applicant had only provided copies of the two amended pleadings on 16 July 2025, being the day before the hearing (which took place on 17 July 2025). 4
19. The purpose and difference of each document was as follows:
(a) MFI 1: As the Applicant described at the hearing, the lengthier version made his case “ easier to understand ”, that is, it served as a document that he would have provided had a request for further particulars of the existing pleading been requested: T4.14-5.10.
(b) MFI 2: The shorter document was amended to include allegations based upon an affidavit that had been served (but not read) by one of the Respondents’ solicitors in support of the summary dismissal application: J [52]-[55].
20. Importantly, neither document altered the Applicant’s case, which remained (in short) that the Wigney Judgment was procured by fraud: J [77]-[78].
21. In the circumstances, the primary judge adopted the following approach:
[24] At the hearing, the Court indicated it proposed to take the practical approach of permitting the filing of one or other of the proposed amended statements of claim if the filing of them would not constitute an abuse of process and one or other of them disclosed a reasonable cause of action that would not be summarily dismissed under s 31A. No party objected to this course.
22. The potential unfairness to the Respondents in not having the time to address each of the new paragraphs in MFI 1 (from a strike out perspective) was alleviated by permitting such complaints to be raised at a later point (if summary dismissal failed): T13.24-14.46.
23. The approach adopted by the primary judge afforded the Applicant the indulgence of relying on either MFI 1 or 2 in opposition to the summary dismissal application even though these two documents were only served the day before the hearing: see paragraph 18 above. All submissions were considered by the primary judge in light of the additional two amended pleadings: see J [77]-[106]. In effect, the primary judge’s approach was to give the Applicant the benefit of having any version of his pleadings (i.e. the existing Statement of Claim, and/or either of the proposed amended versions) considered by the Court. This approach was unquestionably to the Applicant’s procedural and forensic benefit.
24. In the above context, grounds 1 and 2 do not meet the threshold in the two limbs set out in paragraph 9 above and should not be permitted to take up the Full Court’s (and the Respondents’) time and resources.
No challenge to the primary judge’s abuse of process findings
25. Thirdly , the primary judge found that the proceedings (even as propounded through MFI 1 or 2) were an abuse of process. As his Honour stated:
[103] Abuse of process comes in a variety of forms. Here, the abuse lies in the attempt to re-litigate issues which have already been determined, including by the mechanism of asserting that judgments were procured by fraud. That abuse exists whether or not Mr Dunstan understands that is what he is doing, and irrespective of whether he genuinely believes that, underlying all that has gone before, he was wronged in some way. Those issues have been thoroughly explored by many judges and Mr Dunstan was unsuccessful. His continuing attempts to revisit what has been judicially determined constitute an abuse of process.
[104] Allowing the present proceeding to continue would involve an unwarranted use of judicial resources and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute as a result of the Court permitting its resources and processes to be used in the manner described earlier – see: UBS at [43] and [68].
[105] This is not a case in which Mr Dunstan has shown he has a reasonable cause of action, or reasonable prospects of success, but merely failed to disclose that case in his pleadings (the statement of claim) or proposed pleadings (MFI 1 and MFI 2): White Industries Aust Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; 160 FCR 298 at [47]. Having regard to what has been said earlier, and to MFI 1 and MFI 2, it is clear that a further opportunity to replead will not improve Mr Dunstan’s position.
26. The proposed grounds of appeal do not challenge these findings. Further, Wigney J made similar findings of abuse of process which were never appealed (nor were they challenged in the Thawley Proceedings): see Wigney Judgment at [221]-[231].
27. This is fatal to the Applicant’s proposed appeal from continuing to take up Court (and Respondent) resources where unchallenged findings of abuse of process remain. Indeed, it were these very findings that the primary judge relied upon to make the vexatious litigant order against the Applicant: VLO Judgment at [13], [18]-[19].
The vexatious litigant order
28. One final matter to be addressed is the vexatious litigant order made by the primary judge, and its impact on the present application for leave to appeal.
29. There is authority that where an appeal has been filed before the making of a vexatious litigant order (which is then subsequently made), the Court may stay the appeal: McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 5) [2025] FCA 975 at [19]-[22]; Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney (No 4) [2025] FCA 1474 at [78]-[80].
30. However, in the present case, it is to be noted that at the hearing of the vexatious litigant order, the Respondents did not seek any order that impacted upon the present application for leave and the primary judge did not make any such order staying the present application: VLO Judgment at [31]. 5
31. Nevertheless, the Respondents note that the vexatious litigant order was premised on the same abuse of process findings (VLO Judgment at [13], [18]-[19]) and that the primary judge took the additional step to make a vexatious litigant order on that basis. 6 This bespeaks the seriousness and nature of the abuse of process found by the primary judge, which in turn highlights the importance of the complete absence of any challenge to those underlying findings in the present application.
Conclusion
32. The Applicant’s proposed appeal has no prospects of succeeding and, accordingly, his application for leave to appeal should be dismissed with costs.
12 February 2026
J R Clarke SC
N J Condylis
Thomson Geer
1 Order 2 made on 25 July 2025.
2 Cf. the dicta of Bell P (as his Honour then was) in CBRE (V) Pty Limited v Trilogy Funds Management Limited [2021] NSWCA 316 at [8]-[10].
3 Olson v Keefe [2019] FCA 339 at [24]-[28] – in that passage (concerning strike out), Lee J addressed the refusal of the primary judge to permit leave to replead. While this could be seen as an order affecting substantive rights, his Honour still had regard to the ‘practice and procedure’ caution as the issue invoked by the ground of appeal was whether the primary judge erred in refusing leave to replead. Similarly, in the present application, the draft grounds only seek to take issue with the procedural treatment of the proposed amended pleadings.
4 See email chain between the Applicant and Registry on 16 July 2025 (to be tendered): The Applicant emailed the Registry with the “ lengthier ” amended pleading (at 1:55pm) and then the Respondents’ legal representatives (at 3:12pm); this was followed by a further email (at 3:58pm) with the “ shorter ” amended pleading.
5 See also transcript of the VLO hearing, 12 December 2025, at T46.18-49.47.
6 For completeness, the Respondents are aware of a further application (ACD2/2026) filed by the Applicant but have not been served with, and do not know the content of, that application. That matter is next listed before Goodman J on 18 February 2026.
Submissions in Reply by the Applicant:
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS IN REPLY
Application for Leave to Appeal
No. ACD 66 of 2025
Federal Court of Australia
District Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General
COLIN GEORGE DUNSTAN
Applicant
ROBYN ORR and others named in the schedule
Respondents
1. INTRODUCTION
-
These submissions reply to the Respondents' submissions filed on 12 February 2026.
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The Respondents characterise the proposed appeal as "vague" or concerning only "factual or discretionary matters." That characterization is incorrect.
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The proposed appeal raises a specific question of procedural regularity : whether a Court can summarily dismiss a proceeding based on an amended pleading that was not legally before the Court at the time of judgment, and where the filing of that pleading had been hindered by an irregular judicial direction.
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This issue is not a mere "disagreement with findings"; it strikes at the jurisdictional and procedural validity of the summary dismissal delivered on 25 July 2025.
2. THE PROCEDURAL VACUUM: THE RESPONDENTS’ ADMISSIONS
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The Respondents’ own submissions highlight the procedural irregularity of the July 2025 hearing. At paragraph [22] of their outline, the Respondents admit:
"The potential unfairness to the Respondents in not having the time to address each of the new paragraphs in MFI 1... was alleviated by permitting such complaints to be raised at a later point (if summary dismissal failed)."
-
This admission clarifies the "procedural vacuum" in which the judgment was delivered:
a. The Respondents acknowledge that the Amended Statement of Claim (ASOC) was not yet ready for a formal strike-out or summary dismissal hearing.
b. The Respondents effectively confirm that the ASOC was treated as a "hypothetical" document.
c. Nevertheless, the primary judge proceeded to final judgment based on this "hypothetical" document before it was legally filed.
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As a matter of law, a proceeding cannot be summarily dismissed on the basis of a pleading that the Court and the parties have acknowledged is "not yet before the Court" in a way that allows for a fair hearing on its merits.
3. THE JURISDICTIONAL ERROR: SECTION 35A(4)
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The Respondents fail to address the statutory prohibition in s 35A(4) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) .
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The Applicant’s affidavit material establishes that a direction was given to the Registry on 16 July 2025 not to accept the ASOC for filing.
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Section 35A(4) provides that a Registrar, in the exercise of a power of the Court, is not subject to the direction or control of any person. The filing of a document under the Rules is a power exercised by the Registrar.
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This is not a "minor technicality." As noted by Kennett J in Dunstan v Morgan [2024] FCA 982 , the Registry is required to act "according to law." A judicial direction that bypasses the Registrar’s independent statutory duty to file documents—particularly where leave is not required under Rule 16.51 —constitutes a jurisdictional error.
4. SUFFICIENT DOUBT: THE FINDING AT [100]
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The "sufficient doubt" limb of the Decor test is satisfied by the primary judge’s reasoning at [100] of the July 2025 judgment:
"...even if it were established that a fraud was committed which led to Wigney J making the orders which he did, that would not disturb the fact that the proceeding before Wigney J was an abuse of process..."
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This finding creates a significant legal issue suitable for appellate review. It suggests that the doctrine of "Abuse of Process" can be used as an absolute shield, even where the underlying judgment being protected is alleged (and for the purposes of that paragraph, assumed) to have been procured by fraud.
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Such a finding conflicts with the fundamental principle that "fraud unravels all" ( Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702). Whether "Abuse of Process" can legally override a prima facie case of fraud is a substantial question of law.
5. SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE
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The Respondents argue that no "substantial injustice" arises. This ignores the fact that the judgment below was a summary dismissal —a final extinguishment of the Applicant’s claims without a trial.
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Where a final disposition is made within a "procedural vacuum"—where pleadings are not filed, the Registry is irregularly directed, and the Court assumes fraud "would not matter"—the refusal of leave would result in a substantial injustice.
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Granting leave permits these questions of procedural and statutory regularity to be determined in an orderly way by the Full Court, rather than allowing a "final in effect" judgment to stand on a flawed procedural foundation.
6. CONCLUSION
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The proposed appeal raises specific, precise questions of procedural law and statutory interpretation that are not confined to factual disagreement.
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The Respondents' admissions regarding the "alleviated unfairness" only serve to prove that the July 2025 hearing was procedurally premature.
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The Applicant respectfully submits that the threshold for leave is met.
16 February 2026
Colin Dunstan
Applicant
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