Fundamental failures of legal principles

The audio file available here is a deep dive exploring the transition of the legal proceedings from the evidentiary anomalies in a directions hearing discussed earlier into a significant miscarriage of justice during the ensuing trial and sentencing. It specifically examines the mid-trial redefinition of the charges, the retrospective application of the law, and how these judicial shifts effectively neutralized the defence's arguments.

The narrative shifts from the evidentiary discrepancies of the initial May 1999 direction hearing to fundamental failures of legal principles during the subsequent trial and sentencing.

Several key developments underpinning this "miscarriage of justice":

• Mid-Trial Redefinition of the Offense: The court changed the legal interpretation of the offense during the trial. Specifically, while Dunstan was charged with posting an "explosive substance," the judge ruled as a matter of law that the "device itself was an explosive". This "judicial substitution" effectively neutralized Dunstan’s primary defense: that the rifle propellant he used was a flammable substance, not an explosive one, and that he had configured the devices to be functionally inert.
• Retrospective Application of Law: By changing the interpretation mid-trial, the court applied the law retrospectively. This meant that an act that might not have met the legal definition of the charged crime at the time it was committed was suddenly made illegal by a new judicial definition. 
• Sentencing for a Different Offense: A major point of contention is that Dunstan was sentenced for an offense—posting an "explosive device" —that was structurally distinct from the charge of posting an "explosive substance" for which he was tried and convicted. This is a violation of the right to proper notice and the right to be tried by a finder of fact on the specific sentencing charge. 
• Lowering the Prosecution's Burden: The redefinition of "explosive" to include the mechanical device allowed the judge to rule that the offense was committed regardless of whether the sender expected an explosion to occur. This divorced the concept of "knowledge" from the functional capability of the item, allowing a conviction even if Dunstan honestly believed the devices were non-explosive hoaxes. 
• Misapplication of Unrelated Legislation: To justify these shifts, the trial judge borrowed a definition of "explosive" from the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) to apply to a Commonwealth offense under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The source characterizes this as "legal overreach". 

While the first audio overview highlighted a "shaky start" at the directions hearing in May 1999 involving mops, stamps, and incorrect addressees, this follow-up audio provides the framework for a deeper critique of the ensuing criminal trial and sentencing, of how the legal system itself produced an absurd or unfair result.